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J. RODNEY JOHNSON 
Interspousal Property Rights At Death 
(You can't take it with you, but you can prevent your spouse from getting any of it.) 
Introduction 
ONE of the major issues in Virginia law during the 
past decade has been the matter of property rights 
upon the termimttion of a marriage by divorce. Now 
that the concept of equitable distribution has been 
introduced into Virginia law in order to bring about a 
greater degree of fairness into this area, it is time to 
direct the focus of law reform to a parallel issue-
interspousal property rights when a marriage is ter-
minated by death. The importance of this issue to 
large numbers of Virginians is obviou~ when one 
stops to realize that, notwithstanding the dismal sta-
tistics on the increasing incidence of divorce, the typ-
ical Virginia marriage still continues until it is dis-
solved by the death of one of the parties. The 
exposure of this majority of married persons to poten-
tial economic problems is also obvious when one 
stops to realize that, under Virginia law, a su~:ving 
spouse has absolutely no rights in the deceased 
spouse's estate (except as the deceased spouse has 
allowed them to be created).1 The purposes of this 
article are (i) to demonstrate the accuracy of this 
assertion concerning the lack of rights of a surviving 
spouse undPr Virginia law, (ii) to call attention to a 
serious internal conflict between this Virginia law 
and Virginia's announced public policy concerning 
the institution of marriage, and (iii) to urge that the 
recently aborted legislative study dealing with inter-
spousal property rights at death be resurrected in the 
1985 session of the General Assembly. 
Intestate Succession 
Nowhere in the law of intestate succession has the 
change from the common law to the present law been 
more dramatic than in the case of a surviving spouse. 
Under the common law canons of descent a surviving 
spouse was never an heir; an intestate's real estate 
would escheat to his feudaul overlord before it would 
pass to his widow. This common law prohibition was 
eliminated in Virginia's first statute of descent, effec-
tive January 1, 1787, which made the surviving 
spouse an heir in step ten. From this meager begin-
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ning, the General Assembly subsequently moved the 
surviving spouse's position in intestate succession of 
real property up to step four in 1922, to step two in 
1956, and finally to step one in 1982.2 This latter posi-
tion, step one, is also the position that the surviving 
spouse occupies in the distribution of personal prop-
erty in intestate succession.3 Notwithstanding this 
dramatic improvement of the surviving spouse's 
position i.n intestate succession, the fact remain a that 
this position continues to be classified as an "expec-
tancy", as opposed to a "right", and a person can 
easily prevent the operation of these intestate succes-
sion laws by simply writing a will or, as will be 
explained later, by causing his property to pass by 
way of various probate avoidance devices. Thus it is 
clear that a surviving spouse has absolutely no rights 
in the deceased spouse's estate under the laws of 
intestate succession, except as the deceased spouse 
has allowed such rights to be created by (i) dying 
without a will and (ii) leaving assets that pass by 
intestate succession. 
Rights Upon Renunciation of A Will 
It is common knowledge that when a married per-
son dies testate the surviving spouse has a statutory 
right to renounce the will and take a forced share of 
the decedent's personal propert:·. The issue to be 
addressed, however, is not the surviving spouse's 
right to renounce the decedent's will but, instead, 
what rights does the surviving spouse thereby acquire 
in the decedent's personal property? Code 64.1-16 sets 
forth the rights that accrue to the surviving spouse as 
follows: 
Ifrenunciation be made, the surviving spouse 
shall, if the decedent left surviving children 
or their descendants, have one third of the 
decedent's personal estate mentioned in 
§64.1-11; or if no children or their descen-
dants survive, the surviving spouse shall 
have one half of such surplus; otherwise the 
surviving spouse shall have no more of the 
surplus than is given him or her by the will. 
Although the fractional share of the renouncing 
spouse varies according to whether or not the dece-
dent left surviving children or their descendants, the 
base against which that fraction is to be applied is 
always the same. The statute very clearly identifies 
this base as the decedent's net probate personal es-
tate, i.e., that part of the decedent's personal property 
that passes to his personal representative and which 
remains after all debts, taxes and expenses have been 
paid. To state the rather obvious then, if there is no 
net probate estate the net "rights" of the surviving 
spouse amount to nothing. And therein lies the prob-
lem because, as even the neophyte estate planner can 
testify, it is possible to have the benefit of and control 
over any amount of personal property for the entirety 
of one's life and still prevent any of it from being 
included in one's probate estate following his death. 
Witness all of the popular literature dealing with how 
to avoid probate. 
Dillon v. Gow4 is a highly instructive trial court 
decision showing the application of the foregoing 
principle to this matter of interspousal property 
rights at death. In this case Mr. Dillon suffered a 
coronary thrombosis on Saturday, August 20, 1955, 
and was immediately admitted to the Medical College 
of Virginia. The following Monday, August 22, he 
summoned his attorney to his bedside and thereupon 
executed a previously prepared inter-vivos trust of 
$250,000.00 (book value) worth of stock in a close cor-
poration. Under the terms of this trust, Mr. Dillion 
retained (i) the right to all income from the trust fund 
for life, and (ii) the right to appoint the corpus of the 
trust to anyone in the world except to himself, his 
estate, or his creditors (the corpus would go to his 
daughter and her family if this power was not exer-
cised). Mr. Dillon died on September 3, 1955, twelve 
days after he created this trust. Suit was thereafter 
initiated to determine, among other things, whether 
Mrs. Dillrn would receive any portion of this trust 
fund if she should renounce her husband's will and 
demand her statutory forced share in his personal 
estate. The court held that Mrs. Dillon had no rights 
in this trust fund. True she would be entitled to one-
third of Mr. Dillon's net probate personal estate upon 
the renunciation of his will. However, the court con-
cluded that Mr. Dillon had parted irrevocably with all 
but a life estate at the time he executed the trust, and 
his retained life estate expired with him leaving no 
vestige of this stock in his probate estate. In coming 
to his judgment in this case, Judge Lamb found the 
Virginia law to have been settled, since 1813, that "as 
to his personal property, a man could waste it, de-
stroy it or give it away; that during the continuance 
of the marriage the wife had no interest in the prop-
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erty such as would entitle her to claim a fraud if the 
husband should in his lifetime divest himself of title, 
put it beyond his reach so that he could not recover it 
himself."5 Judge Lamb went on to note that "I have 
no doubt that the first statement of that principle of 
law comes as a surprise, if not a shock, to the general 
run of the thoughts of the community, but our laws 
have always recognized what has been spoken of as 
the sacredness of (personal) property and the com-
plete dominion of the owner."11 
The issue in Dillon that appeared to worry the court 
the most was the effect, if any, to be given to Code 
55-BC which voids transfers made" ... with intent to 
delay, hinder or defraud creditors, purchasers or 
other persons of or from what they are or may be 
lawfully entitled to (emphasir added) ... " Judge 
Lamb concluded that existing precedents prevented 
him, at the trial court level, from making an in depth 
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review of this issue. However, this troublesome point 
was laid to rest four years later by the Virginia 
Supreme Court, in Freed v. Judith Realty Corp.,7 
wherein the court held as follows: 
The fact that Freed's purpose in executing 
the trust ... may have been to prevent his 
wife from obtaining any part of the trust 
property at his death through operation of 
the statute of descent and distribution if he 
died intestate or through renunciation of his 
will if he died testate, does not render the 
trust invalid.8 
In Freed, the court also reaffirmed its earlier hold-
ings that "a married man enjoyed during his lifetime 
the unqualified privilege to dispose of his personal 
estate whatever be his purpose in doing so, provided 
that he so dispossess himself of it as to put it beyond 
his power to reclaim (emphasis added),"9 Thus the 
emphasized proviso in the preceding sentence repre-
sents the only restriction upon the married person 
who wishes to eliminate the forced statutory share of 
his surviving spouse by reducing his probate personal 
estate to zero through the use of various probate avoi-
dance devices-the probate avoidance device 
that is chosen may not be one that leaves it within the 
power of the transferor to recover the property. It is 
permissible to retain (i) a life estate in the property, (ii) 
a degree of administrative control over the property, 
and (iii) a non-general power of appointment over the 
property which will enable the transferor to change 
the identity of the ultimate owner of the property up to 
the moment of the transferor's death, but the trans-
feror may not reserve the right to recover the property 
himself. 
It is clear from the emphasized language in Freed, 
above, that where one has made gratuitous lifetime 
transfers of personal property that are not "beyond 
his power to reclaim" at the time of his death such 
personal property will be treated as if it is still the 
transferor's for the purpose of determining the surviv-
ing spouse's forced statutory share. The t~rm "aug-
mented estate" has been coined to identify this 
concept whereiu personal property that is clearly not 
in the probate estate is nevertheless treated as being 
in the probate estate for the purpose of computing the 
forced statutory share of a renouncing spouse. Illus-
trative transfers that would be included in a dece-
dent's augmented estate under present Virginia law 
are revocable trusts, "joint" bank accounts (to the 
extent of the decedent's deposits), joint and survivor-
ship property (insofar as the half that could be rP.cov-
ered is concerned), P.O.D. bank accounts, Totten 
Trust bank accounts, causu mortis gifts, and any 
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other revocable, inter-vivos transfer of personal 
property. 
It may be argued that thiR augmented estate con-
cept operates as a significant impediment to one who 
wishes to prevent his surviving spouse from receiving 
any of his personal property at death because it effec-
tively limits the probate avoidance devices that he 
may safely use to only two, absolute gifts and irrevo-
cable trusts, neither of which is particularly desirable. 
Assuming for the sake of argument that there is any 
undesirability associated with these two probate 
avoidance devices, nevertheless that does not in any 
way help to establish the proposition that the present 
augmented estate concept is a significant impediment 
to the scheming spouse. It must be remembered that 
the augmented estate concept comes into operation 
only when one is determining the forced share of a 
surviving spouse who has renounced the decedent's 
will and, to again state the obvious, if the decedent 
dies intestate there is no right to a statutory forced 
share. Accordingly, one may place his personal prop-
erty in any one or more of the revocable probate avoid-
ance devices mentioned above and then, by simply 
dying intestate, thereby prevent the survivi.1g spouse 
from claiming any portion of this property under the 
augmented estate concept. Although the spouse may 
now be in position number one under intestate suc-
cession, if there will not be any property passing by 
intestate succession (because it is all passing by var-
inus probate avoidance devices) she will still receive 
nothing. Thus, notwithstanding the existence of the 
forced statutory share legislation and the judicially 
created concept of the augmented estate, the fact 
remains that the surviving spouse thereby obtains 
absolutely no rights in the deceased spouse's personal 
property except as the deceased spouse has allowed 
such rights to be created by (i) dying with a will, and 
(ii) leaving personal property that is either in his pro-
bate estate or is treated as being in his probate estate 
under the augmented estate concept. 
Dower & Curtesy 
Although, as noted earlier, a decedent's spouse was 
never an heir at common law, the common law did 
prov1de for a husband to have a curtesy interest in his 
wife's real property and for a wife to have a dower 
interest in her husband's real property. Though 
changed in form and content since the common law, 
the institutions of dower and curtesy are continued in 
Virginia today by Code 64.1-19, which reads in rele-
vant part as follows: 
A surviving spouse shall be entitled to a 
dower or curtesy interest in fee simple of one 
third of all the real estate whereof the 
deceased spouse or any other to his use was 
at any time seized during coverature of an 
estate of interitance, unless such right shall 
have been lawfully barred or relinquished 
(emphasis added). 
It must be admitted that if a man is seized of an 
"estate of inheritance" in "real estate" while he is 
married, there is no way that he can prevent his 
wife's inchoate dower interest therein from becoming 
a possessory estate upon his death. However, it is 
quite simple to acquire, use, and be able to convey 
any quantity of real property during marriage with-
out being seized of an "estate of inheritance" in "real 
estate." The essential element of most such schemes 
is either (i) to acquire the real estate through a corpo-
ration or a partnership (instead of acquiring the real 
estate in one's own name) which will result in one 
owning personal property instead of "real estate " or 
(ii) to acquire the real este.te as joint tenants with the 
right of survivorship with another which will prevent 
one from being seized of an "estate of inheritance" 
(during the joint tenancy). 
Linking this discussion with the preceding one, it is 
easy to see how one can form a corporation through 
which he can acquire whatever real estate he might 
wish and then place the corporate stock in an appro-
priate probate avoidance device, thereby being able to 
acquire, use and convey the real estate in question as 
freely &Fl a fee simple owner and yet prevent hiR sur-
viving spouse from having any dower therein (because 
the stock is personal property) or any forced statutory 
share therein (because of the probate avoidance 
device). Thus the validity of the statement that the 
surviving spouse has absolutely no rights in the 
deceased spouse's real estate under the laws of dower 
and curtesy, except as the deceased spouse has 
allowed such rights to be created by acquiring real 
estate as such, as opposed to acquiring the same real 
estate in a manner that will result in his ownership 
being characterized as personal property. 
In addition to the foregoing, it has been possible 
since common law times to create a special estate in 
real estate in a woman, in which any surviving hus-
band would not be entitled to curtesy. This estate, 
usually referred to as the "equitable separate estate," 
is provided for in Virginia today by Code 64.1-21, 
which reads as follows: 
A surviving husband shall not be entitled to 
curtesy in the equitable separate estate of the 
deceased wife if such right thereto has been 
expressly excluded by the instrument creat-
ing the same, or if such instrument, executed 
heretofore or hereafter, describes the estate 
as her sole and separate equitable estate. 
In Jacobs v. Meade, decided by the Virginia Supreme 
Court on April 27, 1984, it was claimed that this stat· 
ute "is unconstitutional on equal protection grounds 
because the statute fails to grant husbands the same 
rights granted wives." 10 The court did not reach the 
constitutional issue in this case, however, due to the 
existence of Code 64.1-19.1, enacted by the General 
Assembly in 1977 apparently as a response to various 
decisions of the United States Supreme Court involv-
ing gender-based classifications. Code 64.1-19.1 
provides: 
Where the word "curtesy" appears in this 
chapter of the Code, it shall be taken to be 
synonymous with the word "dower" as the 
same appears in this chapter or this Code, 
and shall be so construed for all purposes. 
The court held that "when construed with§ 64.1-19.1, 
§ 64.1-21 provides that a surviving wife shall not be 
entitled to dower in the equitable separate estate of 
the deceased husband if such right thereto has been 
expressly excluded by the instrument creating the 
same, or if such instrument describes the estate as his 
sole and separate equitable eRtate (emphasis in 
original)."11 
As a result of the Jacobs decision, it is no longer 
necessary for a married person who wishes to defeat 
any dower or curtesy rights of the surviving spouse in 
real estate to go through the somewhat cumbersome 
process of converting the real et1tate to personal prop-
erty prior to acquisition and then holding such per-
sonal property in a probate avoidance device at the 
time of death. Now it is possible for a married person, 
male or female, to acquire real estate directly as an 
equita hie separate estatt · nd thereby prevent the 
surviving spouse from having any dower or curtesy 
rights therein. A fortiori, then, the validity of the 
statement that the s1·.rviving spouse has absolutely 
no rights in the deceased spouse's real property under 
the laws of dower and curtesy, except as the deceased 
spouse has allowed such rights to be created by 
acquiring real property as a legal estate, as opposed 
to an equitable separate estate. 
Public Policy Regarding Marriage 
The Virginia Supreme Court has declared that "it is 
the policy of the law to foster and protect marriage, to 
encourage the parties to live together and to prevent 
separation, marriage being the foundation of the fam-
ily and of society, without which there would be 
neither civilization nor progress."12 Acting pursuant 
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to this policy, the court has declared that agreements 
between husbands and wives are "void when they 
tend to encourage or facilitate separation or di-
vorce."13 With this as a background, and without 
going through the exercise of creating an elaborate 
hypothetical fact situation, let the reader simply 
assume an older, female client whose marriage is 
effectively dead but who is hesistant about seeking a 
no-fault di rnrce for family reasons, religious reasons, 
etc. Before responding to her request for advice you 
determine that her husband has been the sole or 
primary wage-earner during their marriage and that 
almost all of "their" property, acquired during the 
mariage, is in his name. How do you advise her? Do 
you explain that if she does go forward with the 
divorce she will be able to obtJ.lin monetary compen-
sation for her share of the marital property under 
Virginia's equitable diRtribution law but that, if she 
decides to honor her marriage vows "until death do us 
part," she may receive none of this marital property 
upon her husband's death except as he so wishes? 
Will this knowledge of the present state of the law 
tend to encourage your client to seek the divorce? Is 
the present state of the law consistent with the decla-
ration of Virginia's public policy regarding marriage 
that is contained in the first sentence of this 
paragraph? 
Law Reform 
By way of response to concerns similar to those 
raised in this article, the 1983 Session of the General 
Assembly passed Senate Joint Resolution No. 51,14 
which created a joint subcommittee 
... to study the body of present Virginia law 
as it affects the transfer of property at death, 
whether by will or intestacy, to determine 
whether the rights of a surviving spouse are 
adequately protected, to study the effect dur-
ing lifetime and at death of the present 
dower and curtesy provisions, and to study 
the concept of an elective share and an aug-
mented estate as a means to protect a surviv-
ing spouse from disinh1:..itance by dll or by 
elimination of property from the probate es-
tate ... 
The subcommittee created by SJR No. 51 reported 
back to the 1984 Session of the General Assembly 
that a majority of its members "agreed that there 
were problems with exiqting law, but could not agree 
on the best method to correct them." 15 Therefore, 
"(r)ecognizing t1'at the substantial work done during 
the course of this study had not resulted in a concrete 
14 
legislative proposal for protecting the surv1vmg 
spouse, on a 6-4 vote of the members present, the joint 
subcommittee recommend(ed) that the study con-
tinue."16 House Joint Resolution No. 54 17 was accord-
ingly introduced into the 1984 Session of The General 
Assembly to provide for a one-year extension. HJR 
No. 54 passed the House of Delegates by a vote of95-1, 
and then died in the Senate Rules Committee. 
Conclusion 
Although this article has been written from the 
standpoint of illustrating how easily a married per-
son can prevent his surviving spouse from receiving 
any portion of his estate, it must not be assumed that 
the problem is confined to cases of intentional schem-
ers. The problem is much broader than that and con-
sequently affects far more persons. As reported by the 
SJR 51 Subcommittee, "changes in the tax laws and 
the ways in which people hold the majority of their 
wealth have made it easier to intentionally or unin-
tentionally disinherit one's spouse (emphasis 
added)."18 
For all of the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully 
submitted'(i) that for far to long an intolerable situa-
tion has existed in the area of interspousal property 
rights at death, (ii) that this situation has now been 
made even worse by the recent decision in Jacobs v. 
Meade, and (iii) that it is incumbent upon the 1985 
Session of the General Assembly to take positive 
action towards protecting the legitimate expectations 
of a surviving spouse under Virginia law. 
FOOTNOTES 
1. For convenience throughoui this article, the surviving 
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assumed to be the husband. Except as specifically noted, how· 
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5. Id .. at83. 
6. Id. 
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tutte such disputes as may later arise are a bar-
gained-for, integral part of the entire agreement. In 
the absence of a compelling reason to the contrary, 
they should be performed. The perceived cost con-
tainment and speed of arbitration, as compared to 
litigation, should not be lost by allowing litigation of 
the condition-precedent issue. Delay in enforcement 
of the intent to arbitrate perverts the goals of 
arbitration. 
It is time for legislative review of the venerable 
laws of Virginia used to determine the enforceability 
offuture-dispute agreements. Section 8.01-577 and the 
common-law, condition-precedent concept may no 
longer meet the needs of the business community in 
its quest for a viable alternative to litigation. Legal 
scholars should contemplate these laws and share 
their observations with those who seek to appreciate 
the parameters of enforcement given the present 
state of the law. Legislators should deliberate before 
amending the existing law in order to make sure that 
future amendments accord with the need to know 
with reasonable certainty whether or not specific 
promises to arbitrate future disputes will be enforced. 
In this connection, the Uniform Arbitration Act 
deserves special attention.21 Its provisions do not dif-
ferentiate in enforcement policy between existing-
and future-dispute agreements.22 As mentioned, it 
has already been adopted by over half of the fifty 
states. 
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